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Abstract 
Significam shifts in the age structure of the New Zealand population are underway. Their principal effect will be f elt 
between 2020 and 2040. The paper documents These changes and compares them with other OECD countries. There 
will be widespread implications for savings, investmel/1 , the currenT account balance, productivity, the labour market, 
growTh of the economy and public expenditures. The paper provides a brief sketch of each of these areas. Behavioural 
response parameters esTimaTed from historical daTa may offer little guide to the future, which will involve age depend-
ency ratios well outside the range previously experienced. Global capital markets will play an important role in the 
intergeneraTional transfer of resources. 
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Across a wide range of countries, populations are aging. 
Typically, the next two or three decades wiH see acceler-
ated changes. These phenomena are especially marked in 
the OECD countries. New Zealand is no exception. 
The implications of these changes are potentially very sig-
nificant. but generally not well understood . The changes 
will have wide-ranging consequences, for individuals, 
governments and nations - in fact for the entire global 
economic system. The effects will be complex and perva-
sive with ramifications throughout society. It is hardly 
surprising to ti nd we lack the analytical apparatus to fore-
cast the impact in fifty years of changes without historical 
precedent. 
In this paper I make no such forecasts. Rather, I attempt 
to build on our understanding of how economic forces 
work, in order to provide a framework for assessing the 
impl ications of aging for the economy. I confine my at-
tent ion to a traditional set of issues found in the econo-
mist 's toolkit - saving, investment, the capital stock, in-
terest rates. the current account, public expenditure and 
the labour market. 
Section 2 of the paper provides a few salient projections 
to highlight the key aspects of demographic change. In 
section 3 I consider the macroeconomic implications for 
the domestic economy, while I broaden the focus to the 
global economy in section 4. I then turn to the labour mar-
ket implications in section 5, before looking at the possi-
ble effect on the level and composition of public spend-
ing (section 6). Conclusions are in Section 7. 
Demographic Changes 
The forecasts for the population and its age structure have 
been well documented and only salient features will be 
summarised here. As a general rule, the Series 4 projec-
tions (Statistics New Zealand, 2000) have been used in 
this paper (medium fenility and mortality rates with the 
long term net migration level set at 5.000). 
Of particular interest are the changes in the dependency 
ratio. Dependency ratios are a convenient way to summa-
rise the changes in the population age structure. They are 
typically calculated as the number aged 65+ as a share of 
the working aged population (15-64). or the number of 
young persons (0-14) again as a share, or the combined 
(total) dependency ratio. What have been the historical 
paths of these ratios in New Zealand and how are they 
projected to change in the future? How do the patterns in 
New Zealand compare to those of other OECD countries? 
Table I provides the basic data for the three key age 
groups, while Table 2 presents the ratios. Figure 1 plots 
the young and old dependency ratios. The young ratio 
has fallen markedly since its peak in 1961 and over the 
next 100 years remains essentially constant after 2021. In 
contrast, the old age dependency ratio, whose increase to 
date has been modest starts to climb sharply for three dec-
ades following 2011 and then grows modestly until the 
end of the current century. 
Clearly these ratios are tending to offset each other. Fig-
ure 2 shows the total (young + old) dependency ratio for 
two centuries. It is expected that the total ratio will reach 
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Table 1. Projected Age Structure of the New Zealand Population:l901-2101 
Population ('000) 
Year 0-14 15-64 65+ Total 
1901 256 517 31 2,188 
1951 571 1,191 178 2,700 
1961 799 1,407 209 2,969 
1971 910 1,709 244 3,125 
1981 849 2,011 316 3,146 
1991 788 2,258 389 3,168 
2001 878 2,526 457 3,336 
2011 812 2,760 566 3.389 
2021 775 2,819 781 3.577 
2031 795 2,739 1,03 1 3,857 
2041 763 2,709 1,170 3,974 
2051 737 2,7 12 1' 181 3,969 
2061 737 2,618 1,221 4,019 
2101 674 2,413 1,152 3,927 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2000); Series 4 projection 
its lowest level by 2011 , and is then projected to rise sub-
stantially. Two series are shown. Consider first the 
unadjusted series based on raw head counts. If the de-
pendency ratio is interpreted as a measure of the share of 
the population whose consumption must be supported 
from the output of the working age population, then it is 
of note that the total "burden" only reaches its former 1961 
peak in 2041. In short, despite the rise in the older popu-
lation, the unadjusted ratio is offset by falls in the young 
age group so that from now until 2041 the total burden 
would be no higher than it had been in the past. 
than the unadjusted series and ends modestly above the 
unadjusted level. It is still the case that it will take more 
than 20 years before the adjusted dependency reaches it 
former peak. While dependency ratios are undoubtedly 
set to increase. they are projected to remain within the 
bounds of historical experience for at least another 20 
years. 
Comparisons with selected OECD countries are given in 
Tables 3 and 4. Comparisons with other OECD countries 
as a group and for Australia are shown for the age (Figure 
3) and total (Figure 4) dependency ratios. Figure 5 indi-
cates that New Zealand 's age dependency ratio, starting 
from a lower base, will rise by more than the OECD aver-
age over the next half century. The increases in the total 
dependency ratio for New Zealand are however, more 
closely aligned to those for the OECD (Figure 6). 
However this assumes implicitly that the consumption 
requirements are uniform across a ll age groups. If an al-
lowance is made for the relative consumption levels of 
the different age groups, an adjusted dependency ratio 
can be constructed. As seen in Figure 2. this ratio is cur-
rently reaching a low point, but then rises more sharply 
Table 2. Dependency Ratios: New Zealand: 1901-2101 
Dependency Ratios 
0 /W W/0 Y/0 Y/W (O+Y )/W 
1901 0.06 16.68 8.26 0.50 0.56 
1951 0. 15 6.69 3.2 1 0.48 0.63 
1961 0.15 6.73 3.82 0.57 0.72 
1971 0. 14 7.00 3.73 0.53 0.68 
1981 0. 16 6.36 2.69 0.42 0.58 
1991 0.17 5.80 2.03 0.35 0.52 
2001 0. 18 5.53 1.92 0.35 0.53 
20 11 0.2 1 4.88 1.43 0.29 0.50 
2021 0.28 3.61 0.99 0.27 0.55 
203 1 0.38 2.66 0.77 0.29 0.67 
204 1 0.43 2.32 0.65 0.28 0.7 1 
2051 0.44 2.30 0.62 0.27 0.71 
2061 0.47 2.14 0.60 0.28 0.75 
2101 0.48 2.09 0.59 0.28 0.76 
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W/{O+Y) (0+ Y)/Total 
1.80 0.36 
1.59 0.39 
1.40 0.42 
1.48 0.40 
1.73 0.37 
1.92 0.34 
1.89 0.35 
2.00 0.33 
1.81 0.36 
1.50 0.40 
1.40 0.42 
1.41 0.41 
1.34 0.43 
1.32 0.43 
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Figure 1. Young and Old Dependency Ratios: New Zealand: 1901-2101 
0.~ .-------~~----~~----~----~------------------
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
0.10 
- Oidl65+1 
• Yot.rgi0-14) 
190 I 195 1 1961 1971 1981 1991 200 I 20 I I 202 1 203 1 2041 2051 2061 210 1 
Figure 2. Total Dependency Ratios for New Zealand: Unadjusted and Adjusted 
by Consumption Weights: 1901-2101 
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Table. 3 Aged Dependency Ratios: Selected OECD Countries: 1950-2050 
OECD Averages 
Year AustraUa Canada Ireland Sweden New Zealand Large Total 
1950 12.4 12.3 17.8 15.5 14.3 
1980 14.8 14.1 18.5 25.4 1S.4 19.1 18.9 
2000 17.5 19.0 16.9 25.1 16.3 21.9 20.8 
2010 18.7 21.4 16.3 26.6 17.5 24.7 22.9 
2020 23.6 28.9 18.7 33.1 23.0 29.5 27.6 
2030 29.0 37.3 22.7 35.4 30.7 35.2 33.3 
2050 31.7 35.8 30.8 35.3 34.8 35.9 35.1 
Percentage Changes 
1950-2050 156 191 73 128 143 
1980-2000 18 35 -9 -1 6 15 10 
1950-2{)()() 41 54 -5 62 14 
2000-2050 81 88 82 41 113 64 69 
Notes: 
l.AU data from OECD (1988). The large OECD countries are Canada. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA 
2. The aged dependency ratio is defined as the number of 65+ as a percentage of the 15-64 age group. 
Within the growing elderly population of New Zealand, 
the share of older persons is projected to rise. The share 
of the 65-69 year olds will decline, while the share of 
those over 80 rises markedly (see Table 5). This change 
may weU have implications for the total health costs of 
the elderly. 
The question is sometimes raised as to whether the future 
population structure could be modified by increasing the 
rate of net immigration. Table 6 shows that even at the 
highest rates of net immigration reported in the popula-
tion projections, the effect on the age dependency ratio is 
modest. In order for New Zealand to maintain its aged 
dependency ratio in 202 1 at the level of 2011 would re-
quire a net addition to the working age population of 0.9 
million, a 33 percent increase. Even at high historical lev-
els of net migration of 20,000 annually, the total net addi-
tion over a decade (assuming all migrants were of work-
Table 4. Total Dependency Ratio: Selected OECD Countries: 1950-2050 
OECD Averages 
Year Australia Canada Ireland Sweden New Zealand Large Total 
1950 53.2 59.8 65.0 50.9 61.3 
1980 53.5 48.1 70.0 56.0 58.0 52.3 55.6 
2000 49.5 47.9. 52.4 51.5 47.6 49.9 50.2 
.. 
2010 48.2 46.6 47.3 52.5 45.7 50.7 49.5 
2020 52.9 55.3 48.5 59.0 50.0 55.8 54.1 
2030 59.5 66.5 54.1 63.2 58.4 63.5 61.9 
2050 63.0 67.7 63.2 65.0 63.4 66.0 65.7 
Percentage Changes 
1950-2050 18 13 -3 28 3 
1980-2000 -7 0 -25 -8 -18 -5 -10 
1950-2000 -7 -20 -19 1 -22 
2000-2050 27 41 21 26 33 32 31 
Notes: 
l.A11 data from OECD (1988). The large OECD countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, UK and USA. 
2.The total dependency ratio is defined as the number of 0-14 plus 65+ as a % of 15-64 age group. 
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Figure 3. Aged Dependency Ratio: New Zealand, Australia and OECD 
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ing age), would amount to only 0.2m. In sum, it seems 
improbable that the projected rise in the age dependency 
ratio could be offset in any significant way through immi-
gration. 
Guest and McDonald (2000) present projections of the 
government expenditure for social outlays under three 
Figure 6. Percentage Changes in the 
Total Dependency Ratio: 
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Table S. Trends in the Age Structure of 
the Elderly Population: 
New Zealand: 1980-2050 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
Aged 65 + 1980 2000 2030 2050 
65-69 37 30 33 26 
70-79 47 48 47 45 
80+ 17 2 1 20 29 
Total 100 lOO lOO 100 
Source: OECD ( 1988), Table A.3. 
different levels of net immigration. By 2031 , social expendi-
ture as a share ofGDP is projected to rise to 26.8 percent 
with a high level of immigration (70,000 annually) and 28.6 
percent if there were zero net immigration. This relatively 
small difference must surely fall within the bounds of fore-
casting error, and adds further weight to the argument 
that the burden of aging is little changed by even marked 
differences in net immigration rates. 
In this section we have concentrated on changes in 
dependency ratios. It should be emphasised however 
that they are only one, somewhat crude indicator, albeit 
simple to calculate and interpret. They tell us nothing 
about the willingness of the working age population to 
meet the implied transfers, about changes in institutions 
or social patterns that might emerge as a response to an 
aging population, how well prepared people are for 
retirement or the contribution the retired make both 
within the fami ly and more broadly (Grimmond, 2000). 
This serves to underscore that the implications of an 
aging population extend far beyond simple demographic 
indices to touch economic, social and institutional 
aspects of society. 
Macroeconomic Changes 
What do these demographic changes mean for saving and 
investment? Will the growth of output be affected? This 
section considers these questions. 
A useful starting point is the results of a simulation pre-
sented by Manhews and Higgins (Higgins and Williamson, 
Table 6. Estimated Age Dependency 
Ratios for Three Levels of Net 
Migration: New Zealand: 
2001-2051 
Year Zero 
0 
Low 
5,000 
2001 0.18 0.18 
2021 0.28 0.28 
2051 0.46 0.44 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2000). 
High 
20,000 
0.18 
0.26 
0.39 
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Figure 7. Simulated Effect of a "Baby Boom" on the Age Structure of the Population 
and on the Flow of Saving and Investment 
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1966 ). For a stylised economy they start from a steady 
state and then allow the ferti lity rate to rise, after which it 
gradually declines to a new lower steady state level. In 
other words their model simulates the baby-boom phe-
nomenon. The age distribution of the population now 
evolves with the share of the young rising sharply to start 
with. and then declining. Mean while the share of the prime 
age and the old initially fall. But then there is a marked 
increase in the share of the old as the baby boomers pass 
through their life cycle. 
These trends and their implications for saving and invest-
ment are plotted in FigUie 7. As a result of the higher 
dependency burden at the start, savings fall, but increase 
in line with the prime age population as the baby boomers 
moves into their higher saving periods of the life cycle. 
With the increase in new entrants to the labour force, in-
vestment increases in order for the capital labour ratio to 
remain constant. As fertility declines, the investment rates 
subsequently declines to a new steady state level. In an 
open economy. the current account balance follows the 
evolution of saving and investment. The initial fall in sav-
ing and the increased investment needs imply a current 
account deficit for the younger growing economy as it 
imports capita l. As the population matUies, so the current 
account balance improves. 
These results mirror the life cycle hypothesis in which the 
prime age population (especially at the upper end of this 
range) account for much of the total private saving as they 
prepare for retirement. As a consequence, an increase in 
the elderly dependency ratio should be associated with a 
sharp decline in household saving. Even if the elderly do 
not actually decurnuJate assets and continued to save (as 
some evidence suggests) then household saving would still 
decline provided their saving rate was below that of the 
working-age population. 
Given the already low level of household saving, a pre-
diction of further falls as the population ages might well 
be of concern. Broadly speaking the aggregate data from 
cross-country comparisons, support a declining level of 
household saving as the elderly dependency ratio rises. 
Yet when savings by the elderly are estimated from micro 
data (individual household surveys) they do not appear to 
fall consistent with the aggregate data. Disney argues that 
the macro and micro findings can be reconciled through 
the role played by bequests (Disney, 1996). 
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Table 7. An Estimate of the Possible 
Eft'ect of Population Aging on 
the Annual Flow of Household 
Saving: 2001 and 2051 
Population ('000) 
Number ef Working Age 
Number of Retirees 
Total 
Annual Income ('000) 
Working Age 
Retirees 
Average Saving Rate (%) 
Working Age 
Retirees 
Total 
Saving ($million) 
Working Age 
Retirees 
Total Household Saving 
Total Supply of Funds 
As share of GDP 
2001 
2,526 
457 
3,861 
40 
20 
15 
10 
14.2 
15,156 
914 
16,070 
0.15 
2051 
2,712 
1,181 
4,630 
84 
42 
15 
10 
13.5 
34,257 
4,973 
39,229 
0 .17 
However, the observed lack of decline in saving rates by 
the e~derly may be due to mis-measuremnt. If, as Miles 
argues, the payments to the elderly from private pensions 
are counted as income with no allowance made for the 
depletion of capital as the fund is drawn down, then sav-
ing rates among the elderly may be systematically over-
stated by this mis-measurement (Miles, 1999). Bosworth 
et a/ calculated US saving rates with and without the ad-
justment for pension wealth, finding that for households 
over 64 years of age the adjustment reduced the meas-
ured saving rate from 14.9% to 1.8% in 1972-73, from 
11.5% to -3.9% in 1982-85 (Bosworth, Burtless and 
Sabelhaus, 1991 ). Clearly this effect will be greater where 
private and occupational pensions form a greater share 
retirement income than in New Zealand, where the ma-
jority of total income is from the PA YG system of tax and 
transfer. 
Table 7 summarises an attempt to assess the effects on 
household saving arising from changes in the demographic 
structure. I have assumed that income grows at 1.5 per-
cent per annum and that the average saving rates do not 
change between 2001 and 2051. Some what surprisingly, 
despite the effect of population aging, total savings would 
still rise roughly in line with income. In fact as shown in 
the last line of the table, the overall supply of household 
saving as a share of GDP remains constant. Assuming 
that investment needs rise in line with GDP growth (ie. 
assuming a constant capital:output ratio) and that there is 
no significant change in public saving, then the balance 
between domestic saving and investment requirements 
would not be expected to alter dramatically. 
The sheer increase in the numbers of the elderly, even if 
their saving rate was only modestly lower than the work-
ing-age population, would seem to support the case for 
predicting a fall in private saving. To examine this in more 
detail, age-specific saving rates are required. Data for 
forming such estimates are scarce. One possible source is 
the Household Economic Survey. A preliminary estimate 
of the median saving rate was made. Only households 
where the age of the head was between 20 and 70 were 
included, and households reporting negative disposable 
incomes were excluded. The value for the group of 70 
and older was assumed to be half that of the 60-69 age 
group. 
The results are shown in Table 8. When these are weighted 
by the projected population in each age category, there is 
little change in the overall median household saving rate 
Table 8. Impact of Changes in the Population Age Structure on the Median Household 
Saving Rate in New Zealand : 2001-2041 
Population ('000) 
Year 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
2001 513 591 559 432 286 
2011 537 516 612 553 403 
2021 570 540 537 606 520 
2031 510 573 562 535 569 
2041 505 514 596 561 508 
0.14 I 0.13 
Median Saving Rates 
0.18 0.24 0.17 
Notes: I . The last row are the median saving rates from the HES 
2. The value 70+ group is taken as half the 60-69 group. 
70+ 
329 
395 
544 
751 
914 
0.085 
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Weighted 
Median Saving 
Rate 
Total 
2710 0. 16 
3016 0. 16 
3317 0. 16 
3500 0. 15 
3598 0.15 
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from 2001 to 2041. This is consistent with the result that 
the total supply of household saving would not decline 
significantly despite the increase in the share of the eld-
erly. 
What evidence do we have from other countries? Studies 
by Weil (Weil, 1994) and Disney (Disney, 1996)based on 
9 and 19 OECD countries respectively shed some further 
light on the relation between the age structure and the 
level of household savings. Based on these results, mov-
ing one percent of the total population from the working 
age to the retired aged group would be associated with a 
fall in savings of between I and 2 percent. Between 2021 
and 2031 approximately 5 percent of the New Zealand 
population will move from the working to the retired age 
group. Were New Zealand saving behaviour to mirror the 
long run panems of other OECD countries we could ex-
pect this to result in a fall in savings of between 5 and 10 
percent. Of course if household sav ing continues to rep-
resent a relatively small share of national saving (say less 
than 20 percent), then the impact on aggregate saving 
would likely be modest. 
Disney ( 1996) also presents results for investment and 
growth rates based on 19 OECD countries for 1977-1992. 
The rate of investment is found to be negatively related to 
the aged dependency ratio. If we again apply this fmding 
to New Zealand, then between 2021 and 2031 we would 
predict a fall in the growth rate of gross fixed capital for-
mation by 0. 7 percent pa. From the same study we can 
extrapolate the overall OECD effect of aging on GDP 
growth rates to New Zealand. Our aged dependency ratio 
is projected to rise from 0.21 in 2021 to 0.38 in 2031. 
This factor alone would be expected to reduce real eco-
nomic growth rates by 0.5 percent annually. 
For New Zealand, a recent pre liminary study by Choy 
finds weak evidence for a negative effect on saving from 
the rise in age dependency based on data from 1978 to 
1999. Extrapolating from this estimate, suggests that the 
projected rise in age dependency could be expected to 
reduce the household saving rate very substantially (Choy, 
2000). The diffi culty with us ing thi s and other 
retrospectives studies as a source of behavioural response 
parameters for forecasting is that future changes in the 
age dependency fall well outside historical experience. It 
is unlikely that the same parameter values would apply to 
such changed c ircumstances. meaning that history can be 
only a limited guide. Furthermore. these forecasts depend 
on the particular policy settings adopted by New Zealand 
as well as any changes in the behavioural response pa-
rameters themselves. 
The Global Economy 
Changes in national levels of saving and investment as a 
consequence of demographic changes have implications 
beyond national borders in a world where countries are 
linked through goods. labour and capital markets. Imag-
ine a simple world of only two countries. In country A 
there is a high youth dependency ratio associated with a 
growing population. The demand for capital is high and 
Country A has a current account deficit. In contrast the 
population of country B is aging, and tending to become 
a capital exporter on the assumption that the demand for 
investment falls faster than saving. Capital flows from the 
surplus to the deficit country. 
If growing economies in the developing world are able to 
fmance more of their own investment needs from domes-
tic saving, Higgins argues this would reinforce ''the trend 
toward global capital abundance". (Higgins, 1998). He 
concludes his study with the prediction that in OECD 
countries the saving rate will fall, and current account 
surpluses increase over the next two decades. This fmd-
ing is supported by an OECD study.(OECD, 1988) Faster 
growing developing countries, will remain capital import-
ers in the medium term. However in the longer term they 
are expected to become net capital exporters 
The emergence of current account surpluses in the OECD 
over the next two decades arises from changes in the de-
sired saving and investment balances. With a relatively 
smaller labour force, capital requirements would grow less 
rapidly than in the past, assuming a constant capital:labour 
ratio. This would dampen domestic investment require-
ments. At the same time there could be a rise in saving as 
those who will retire around 2020 move through the life 
stages where saving is typically higher. In addition there 
may well be some increment to national savings from the 
prefunding of public pension schemes. 
The result of these trends in desired saving and invest-
ment levels would be for the stock of net foreign assets of 
the OECD to build up in the non-OECD regions. How-
ever, as the numbers retiring increase significantly from 
2020 on, then this stock of assets would be drawn down. 
This would be accompanied by current account deficits. 
However it is through intertemporal transfer of assets that 
the negative impact on living standards can be partially 
ameliorated. In the absence of such a global mechanism, 
higher taxes on the working age population and/or reduced 
levels of real consumption by the retired would be more 
likely in an aging population. This serves to underscore 
the importance of global capital markets. 
The standard argument is that these markets contribute to 
increasing the overaU return to scarce global capital, by 
signally its allocation to those regions where the returns 
are highest. In the context of changes in the age structure 
of whole populations, global capital markets assume an 
additional role by allowing capital to move across bor-
ders in a marmer equivalent to an intergenerational trans-
fer. 
Critical to any long-term projections, is what might hap-
pen to interest rates and asset prices. The trends in saving 
and investment suggested by the aging population sug-
gest that initially one might expect a period of relatively 
stable or lower interest rates and increasing prices for real 
and fmancial assets as the demand for them rises as the 
higher saving cohorts move through their peak saving 
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Figure 8. Growth Rate of the New Zealand Labour Force: 1998-99 
to 2050-2051 
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years. The rise in equity prices generally in the 1990's 
may well be related in part to the large increase in vol-
umes of private savings directed into mutual funds. 
As those cohorts them move through the retirement phase 
of their life cycle and start to sell off assets (either through 
privately held pension schemes or through prefunded pub-
lic schemes) then it is to be expected that there would be 
downward pressure on asset prices. This would be accen-
tuated by the fact that most OECD countries will be expe-
riencing a similar pattern of contemporaneous changes in 
the demographic age structures. 
Labour Market and Growth 
Commensurate with the aging population. it is expected 
that the growth in the labour force will decline and even-
tually become negative (Figure 8). There are two poten-
tially important consequences. The fust concerns the im-
pact of an aging labour force. If it is the case that labour 
productivity increases through the working life. then at 
least up to some point, the overall effect on productivity 
in the short run may well be favourable as the working 
age population ages. 
The second impact stems from the slower growth of the 
labour force. Total economic growth can be decomposed 
into three key components: the growth rate of the labour 
force (weighted by the share of labour); the growth rate 
of the capital stoc k (weighted by the share of capital); 
and the growth rate of total factor productivity. 
If the capital:output ratio is assumed to remain constant. 
then the overall rate of economic growth depends only on 
the growth of the labour force (along with labour 's share), 
together with the overall growth in productivity. When 
the labour force is growing at I percent and overall pro-
ductivity at say a long run average of also 1 pe rcent, then 
the economic growth rate would be 2.7 percent annually 
(based on a labour share of 0.6). However in the period 
2025-2030 the labour force is expected to be declining 
by -0.3 percent annually. Even if the productivity growth 
remained unchanged , the overall rate of economic growth 
would slow to around 1.4 percent. In other words the fall 
in the growth of the labour force could potentially cut the 
overall economic g rowth rate by almost one half. 
Of course this slowdown could be offset were the rate of 
total factor productivity growth to rise. To maintain the 
initial rate of growth of2.7 percent however, productivity 
growth would need to rise from the starting level of I 
percent annually to 1.8 percent, a significant rise indeed. 
In summary, projected declines in the rate of growth of 
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Table 9. Unit Costs per Capita for Public Expenditure by Age Groups 
Age Group Health Education NZ Super Other Welfare Total 
0-14 1,675 2,928 0 0 4,603 
15-64 1,122 947 273 2,492 4,834 
65+ 4,478 12 11.912 464 16,866 
Total 1,612 1.303 1,468 1,698 6,081 
Note: Data were derived from the 1997-98 HES files, and adjusted to 2000-Q 1 constant dollars 
the labour force will reduce the overall rate of economic 
growth. To offset this, the rate of factor productivity growth 
would have rise substantially. 
In short, the aging of the population and the associated 
slow down (and eventual decline) in the labour force, 
would likely result in a fall in the rate of economic growth. 
There are two possible avenues through which this effect 
could be ameliorated. The first is if the labour force par-
ticipation rates were to rise. The second would be through 
improved productivity, particularly of labour. 
What would be the overall increase in needed in the level 
so that output per person is a product of the complement 
of the total dependency ratio (W lP), the labour force par-
ticipation rate (L/W), the employment rate (ElL) and la-
bour productivity (0/E). 
Using data for 2001 we have: 
$28,000 = (0.65). (0.75). (0.94). (61,000) 
By 2051, the working age population will have fallen from 
65 to 58 percent of the total population. The effect of this 
aging would be to reduce output per person to: 
of labour productivity to hold output per person con~tant $24,900 = (0.58) . (0. 75) . (0.94) . (61 ,000) 
in the face of population aging? 
or by 11 percent. In order to hold real output per person 
To address, consider the following relationship: constant, labour productivity would have to rise by 12 
percent to $68,000. 
(0/P) = (W/P). (L/W). (ElL). (0/E) 
where: 
0 = total output 
P = total population 
W = working age population 
L = labour force 
E = employment 
$28,000 = (0.58) . (0.75). (0.94) . (68,000). 
That is, simply to retain the current level of command 
over real goods and services per capita, the level of la-
bour productivity would have to rise by 12 percent to off-
set the effect of aging, before any increments to real out-
put growth were achieved. 
Table 10. Impact of Projected Demographic Change on Total Social Expenditure 
(2000-2001=100) 
Year Health 
1901 18 
1951 49 
1961 61 
1971 71 
1981 80 
1991 88 
2001 lOO 
2011 110 
202 1 125 
2031 142 
204 1 150 
2051 151 
2061 152 
2101 142 
Education Social Welfare 
Super All Other 
25 8 20 
56 40 47 
74 47 55 
86 55 67 
88 70 79 
90 86 89 
lOO lOO lOO 
101 122 110 
lOO 164 114 
99 212 112 
97 239 112 
95 241 112 
94 249 109 
86 234 101 
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Total HEW 
18 
48 
58 
69 
79 
88 
100 
111 
127 
143 
152 
152 
153 
143 
Table 11. Total Social Welfare Costs in 2001$ with Health and Super Growing at 1.5% pa 
(2000- 2001=100) 
Year Health Education 
1901 18 25 
1951 48 56 
1961 60 74 
1971 71 86 
1981 80 88 
1991 88 89 
2001 lOO 100 
2011 128 101 
2021 169 lOO 
2031 222 99 
2041 273 97 
2051 317 95 
2061 371 94 
2101 628 86 
Note that the same rates of labour force participation and 
employment were used for both 2001 and 205 1 in mak-
ing the above estimates. Rising incomes might be expected 
to increase the demand for leisure and lower participa-
tion rates especially in form of earlier retirement. This 
trend has been evident in the past. Lower participation 
rates may also emerge in future if the demand for highly 
skilled workers leads to longer periods of tertiary educa-
tion and training. In contrast, increased life expectancies 
may tend to offset the tendency to earlier retirement. These 
issues warrant further research. 
If tax increases are needed to meet higher social costs 
associated with aging, then a disincentive effect on la-
bour supply could arise. Guest and McDonald (2000) show 
Social Welfare 
Super All Other 
8 20 
40 47 
47 55 
55 67 
70 79 
85 89 
lOO lOO 
142 110 
221 114 
332 112 
434 112 
508 11 2 
608 109 
1039 101 
Total HEW 
17 
47 
58 
69 
79 
88 
lOO 
121 
153 
195 
234 
264 
303 
478 
that for Australia the effect is to reduce income below that 
which would have been generated, but the costs of social 
programmes as a share of GDP only increases by 0.6 to 1.2 
percentage points. 
Fiscal Costs 
What might an aging population mean for public sector 
expenditures? This question is important for a number of 
reasons. If the costs are expected to rise, wi ll taxation 
revenues grow commensurately? Would it imply that the 
existing level of social bene tits provided by the state might 
not be maintained? And what would it mean for public 
saving levels? As we have seen in recent years, public 
saving has been a major element of aggregate national 
Table 12. Total Social Expenditure Costs per Capita of Working age Population: 
(2000-2001=100) 
Total Social Welfare Costs in 2001$ per capita 15-64 
Health &Super Growing at 1.5% pa 
Year Health Education Social Welfare Total HEW 
Super All Other 
1901 88 12 1 40 97 85 
1951 103 119 84 99 100 
1961 108 132 84 99 104 
1971 105 127 81 99 102 
1981 100 111 88 99 99 
1991 98 lOO 95 99 98 
2001 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 117 92 130 100 Ill 
202 1 151 89 198 102 137 
2031 205 92 306 104 180 
2041 255 90 405 105 2 18 
2051 295 89 473 105 246 
2061 358 90 586 105 292 
2101 657 90 1088 105 500 
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Table 13. Per Capita Social Expenditures by Age Group, and Projected Changes in tbe 
Level and Burden of Total Social Expenditures: Selected OECD Countries and 
Comparison with New Zealand 
Per Capita Social Expenditures 
relative to 
Country 15-64 age group 
0-14 15-64 65+ 
Canada 1.4 1.0 3.7 
France 1.9 1.0 5.1 
W.Germany 1.7 1.0 5.3 
Italy 0.9 1.0 3.5 
Japan 2.3 1.0 5.3 
UK 1.9 1.0 4.0 
USA 1.5 1.0 5.7 
New Zealand 0.9 1.0 3.5 
Source: OECD data from OECD ( 1988). 
saving. Furthermore, expectations of changes in public 
spending can induce changes in the level of private sav-
mg. 
In this section we adopt a simple approach to estimating 
the effect of an aging population on public expenditure. 
We restrict the focus to expenditure on health, education 
and welfare (the laner split into superannuation and all 
other benetlts). The aim is to look solely at the influence 
of a changing age structure of the total costs of these serv-
ices, and to relate that costs to some measures of the econo-
my's capacity to bear them. In other words we wish to 
isolate the demographic changes from all other effects. 
To do this we apply standard per capita unit costs for the 
period from 1901 to 2101. Clearly there have been sig-
nificant changes in the policies governing these expendi-
tures in the past, and one can confidently predict further 
changes in future. However the purpose here is to abstract 
from the policy changes and capture the "pure" demo-
graphic shifts. 
The standard costs were estimated on a per capita basis 
from the 1997-87 Household Economic Survey and then 
adjusted for inflation to 200-01 (see Table 9). These are 
then applied to the population in each of the three key age 
groups (0- 14, 15-64, 65 and over) in order to estimate the 
total costs in each of the selected years. The results are 
shown in Table I 0. 
The first point to note is that the total costs while continu-
ing to rise, do so more slowly than in the past. Since 1950 
total costs half doubled, driven by increases in the total 
population. However, despite the aging of the population, 
total costs are projected to rise by only about one half in 
the next 50 years. There are predictably, large differences 
in the components of expenditure. Slow growth in the 
population means lower relative numbers of young peo-
Impact of Projected Demographic Change 
(1980 =100) 
Social Expenditure Financing Burden per 
bead of 15-64 age group 
2010 2040 2010 2040 
141 187 109 145 
116 128 104 132 
104 97 113 154 
108 107 106 139 
141 140 137 154 
101 110 96 111 
125 165 99 131 
140 192 102 142 
ple so education costs fall (note that for simplification all 
the public education costs are assigned to the 0-14 year 
old group). The marked change is in the costs of superan-
nuation. Driven by an aging population these would more 
than double between now and 2030. They would eventu-
ally rise to over 40 percent of the health, education and 
welfare budget from around 20 percent in 1980. 
We repeat the calculations and allow unit health and su-
perannuation costs to grow at 1.5 percent annually in line 
with the assumed overall rate of growth of real GDP. The 
results in Table 11 serve to underscore the importance of 
superannuation costs as the population ages. 
Table 14. Projected Public Expenditure on 
Pensions and Health : Selected 
OECD Countries and 
Comparison with New Zealand: 
2030 
(% GDP) 
Country Pensions Health Total 
Australia 3.8 7.6 11.6 
UK 5.5 7.0 12.0 
USA 6.6 8.2 15.2 
New Zealand 9.4 8.9 18.3 
Canada 9.0 10.3 19.3 
Japan 13.4 6.3 19.3 
France 13.5 8.9 21.9 
Germany 16.5 7.8 24.8 
Italy 20.3 8.1 28.1 
Sources: OECD (1996) and see Guest and McDonald 
(2000) NZ data from L TFM 
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Table 15. Projected Public Expenditure for Health, Education and Welfare: New 
Zealand and Australia 
(% ofGDP) 
New Zealand Australia 
Year Health Education Welfare Total Health Education Welfare Total 
2001 6.6 5.6 12.6 24.8 5.7 4.6 10.3 20.6 
2011 6.4 5.9 12.3 24.6 6. 1 4.2 10.9 21.2 
2021 . 7.4 5.5 13.8 26.7 6.9 4. 1 12.4 23.4 
2031 9.0 5.4 16.2 30.6 7.9 4.1 13.8 25.9 
2041 10.3 5.5 17.6 33.3 8.6 4.1 14.6 27.3 
2051 10.9 5.3 18.0 34.2 8.9 4.1 15.0 28.0 
Sources: NZ LTFM: Version BPSBUP and for Australia, Guest and McDonald (2000). 
It is pertinent to enquire as to the ''burden·· these costs 
might represent. There are a number of ways in which 
this might be assessed. In the ftrst instance the costs per 
capita on the working age are estimated. The rationale for 
this is that all the resources consumed in these activities 
must come from the production of the working age popu-
lation. These results are summarised in Table 12. Again 
the superannuation costs stand out. 
However, as incomes can be expected to grow, it is not 
entirely fair to assess the burden in per capita terms (which 
implicitly assumes constant real incomes). To address this 
we allow the average income of the 15-64 year old group 
to grow at 1.5 percent annually until 2101. We then cal-
culate the share of average income that is represented by 
the growing total health, education and welfare budget. If 
these costs are currently 28 percent of the average wage, 
they would rise to 34 percent by 204 1, a 20 percent in-
crease. The rises until 2021 are modest. with the greatest 
increase coming in the decade from 202 1 to 203 1. 
Finally, how do these trends in the ftscal costs of social 
expenditures in New Zealand compare with other coun-
tries? Table 13 compares the levels and the "'burden·· of 
growing expenditures for selected OECD countries. New 
Zealand appears to be at the upper end of the distribution 
but not outside the range of projected costs in other coun-
tries. 
Another perspective on our relative position can be gained 
by comparing the projected share of GDP that would be 
needed to meet rising social expenditures. Table 14 sug-
gests that by 2030 the expenditure on pensions and health 
as a share of the GDP will fall comfortably within the 
range expected for major OECD countries. While the 
composition and timing may differ, the total effect pro-
jected for New Zealand should not be seen as abnorrnal. 
A more direct comparison with Australia is made in Ta-
ble 15. Over the crucial period from 2001 to 2031, social 
expenditures in New Zealand are projected to rise by 5.8 
percentage points of GDP. The comparable ftgure for Aus-
tralia is 5.3. In every category while there are minor dif-
ferences in the level and timing of changes the overall 
growth in social expenditure is remarkably similar. 
One implication of this is the possible increases in taxa-
tion necessary to meet these costs. Concern is sometimes 
raised that if New Zealand does not take steps to smooth 
the tax rates through time, we could be faced with a marked 
increase (especially from 202 1 to 2031) which might re-
sult in accelerated out migration. In fact, the international 
comparisons presented here. and notably those for Aus-
tralia, suggest that this concern may not in fact be so seri-
ous. It appears to be that most other countries will face 
similar tiscal pressures. Of course over time their re-
sponses may differ, as some choose to sustain or expand 
current per capita expenditures, while in others some of 
the pressure may be relieved through reductions in ben-
efit levels and eligibility. But concerns that New Zealand 
tax rates would have to move to rates significantly out of 
Line with other OECD countries simply as a result of ag-
ing seem to be over played, based on current projections. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The key points which emerge from this overview are as 
follows: Unquestionably major changes will occur as a 
result of an aging population. The ultimate outcomes will 
depend on behavioural responses, and the way policies 
institutions evolve. The projections lie well outside the 
range of historical experience, limiting the value for fore-
casting of studies based on existing data. Similar demo-
graphic changes phenomena are occurring in many coun-
tries it is the relative changes that will matter and 
globalisation will continue to be important in shaping 
outcomes. Aged dependency ratios in New Zealand are 
expected to rise in line with other OECD countries, al-
though it may take up to another 40 years before total 
dependency ratios reach their levels of 1961 . Household 
saving is expected to decline as more of the population 
moves into the retired aged group. Only limited empirical 
estimates are available of the ma!.mitude of this decline, 
~ 
and the evidence is mixed for New Zealand. Investment 
needs can be expected to decline in line with the falling 
labour force, and the rate of economic growth may slow. 
The implications for the current account balance depend 
on not only on the relative movements in the desired level 
of saving and investment domestically, but also upon glo-
bal capital flows. Global capital markets can play an im-
portant role in the intergenerational allocation of capital. 
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This paper has constructed some scenarios by applying 
historical patterns of behaviour to projected economic 
trends. This approach, rightly labelled as "mechanistic" 
by Helier and Symansky (Helier and Symansky, 1997), is 
merely intended to provide a base line as to what might 
happen given projected demographic changes alone. It is 
usefu l for separating out the pressures that are expected 
to arise from the changing age structure, and is not in-
tended as a forecast of the future time path of key eco-
nomic and social variables. Asset prices and interest rates, 
technological possibilities, the demand for skills of dif-
ferent mixes. changing patterns of consumption and lei-
sure are just some of the forces that will shape the future. 
Institutions will evolve to take advantage of new oppor-
tunities and changed re lative prices. 
Canberra: Centre for International and Public Law, 
ANU and the Taxation Law and Policy Research Unit, 
Deakin University. Disney, R (1996) Aging and 
Saving. Fiscal Studies 17:2,83-101. Elmendorf, D. 
W. and Sheiner, L. M ( 1999) Should America Save 
for its Old Age? Population Aging, National Saving 
and Fiscal Policy. In Federal Reserve Board, 
Washington DC. Kohl, R. and O ' Brien, P (1998}. 
The Macroeconomics of Aging, Pensions and 
Savings: A Survey. In Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris. Weil, D. N.: 
1997. 'The Economics of Population Aging', in M. 
R. Rosenzweig and 0 . Stark, (eds.), Handbook of 
Population and Fam ily Economics, Vol. 18, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 967-1014.,). 
Mechanistic projections, which fail to incorporate these 4 Note that it is the relative change in these shares not 
their absolute levels that are germane to this analysis. 
Clearly, the expenditure for health education and 
welfare is meet from all sources of tax revenue and 
not borne exclusively by the income of the working 
age population. 
behavioural responses. will run the same risk as the pro-
jections of the Club of Rome. Future research must con-
stantly seek to retine the behavioural responses to changes 
in population aging. 
While saving is a key behavioural variable that wiU doubt-
less be influenced by shifts in the age distribution, our 
knowledge of the relation between saving and the depend-
ency rates is very sketchy. This is particularly true for 
New Zealand. where re liable estimates of current saving 
rates either in aggregate or at the household level are in 
short supply. A better understanding of the age related 
saving profile of households is essential, both as a basis 
for building a clearer picture of future macroeconomic 
changes, and to assess the adequacy of saving for retire-
ment. The latter will be significantly helped by the results 
of the forthcoming Household Saving Survey be ing con-
ducted by Statistics New Zealand. 
Notes 
1 DISCLAiMER: The views expressed are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the New Zealand Treasury. The Treasury takes no 
responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for 
the correctness of. the information contained in this 
paper. 
2 The adjustment factors and are 0. 72. 1.00 and 1.27 
for the three aged groups young, working and old, 
respectively Cutler, D.M. Poterba, J. M .. Sheiner. 
L. m. and Summers, L : 1990. An aging Society: 
Opportunity or Challenge? Brookings Papers on 
Economic activity 11 90. 1-73. 
3 There is an extensive literature in this area. The 
interested reader is referred to Leibfritz, W. , 
Roseveare, D .. Fore, D. and Wurzel, E.: 1995. Aging 
Populations, Pension Systems and Government 
Bud gets: How do they Affect Saving? In 
Organi sation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Paris. Disney, J. and Krever, R. ( eds) 
( 1996) Superannuation. Savings and Taxation. 
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